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1Abstract
In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors
to enforce their optimal outcomes.  And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy
implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable.
Repeated implementation problems are drastically different.  This paper provides a strong
implementation “folk theorem”:   for patient implementors, every outcome function they care
about is dominant-strategy implementable.
1. Introduction
Moving from static one shot environments to dynamic repeated ones can enrich the
implementation literature in several ways.   This paper highlights these possibilities by offering a
formal detailed analysis of a simple example that points to pronounced improvements.
In the one shot problem an implementor has to select a single social alternative, from a set
of feasible ones, that will be optimal relative to his own preferences and the unknown
preferences of the members of a group of participants.   Since the participants' preferences are not
known to him, and since they may act strategically in supplying needed information,  the
implementor has to find a method, or a game, whose strategic equilibrium outcome has the
desired optimality.   It is well known that in many cases this is an impossible task. 1  This has
often led researchers to forego the goal of dominant strategy implementation and turn to
Bayesian, Nash, or other types of implementation.2
But, for many economic applications, imposing a one shot selection procedure may be
unduly restrictive.  The problem of selecting a socially optimal path of economic growth allows a
move  to dynamic implementation, where economic choices can be made repeatedly and updated
as feasible sets and information become available.  An implementor can also increase the set of
feasible choices in a repeated static problem by offering inter-temporal solutions.  For example,
in a one shot procedure designed to select a chairman of an economics department, the dean may
be restricted to the choice of a micro-economist or a macro- economist. But in a repeated
selection problem, she can consider solutions that alternate between micro and macro economists
                                                
1
 The following papers, and their references, describe some major studies:  Arrow (1963), Barbera and Jackson
(1995), Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979), Gibbard (1973), Hurwicz (1972), Hurwicz (1990), Ledyard
(1977), Moore (1992) and Satterthwaite (1975).
2in consecutive periods.
Even from a purely technical point of view, the differences between a one shot
implementation and a dynamic one can be substantial.3  One major factor lies with the ability to
learn people's preferences by observing their past choices.  While this is impossible in one shot
implementation it is essentially unavoidable  in repeated interaction.  The learning can be done
by the implementor as well as by  the players observing each other and the implementor's past
choices.
It is, however, not clear a priori whether repetition and learning makes implementation
easier or harder.  Consider for example the problem of determining socially optimal levels of
individual contributions to the problem of cleaning air pollution.4  In an attempt to free ride on
the contribution of others, agents who wish to be charged a little are likely to exaggerate down
the importance of this undertaking.  However, if too many agents do so, society may end up with
polluted air which does not reflect the true preferences of its members.   If the decision on
optimal contributions were done repeatedly,  it is not clear whether such inefficiency could
persist.  After some time society’s members would learn that the air did not get cleaned, and the
free riders would have an informative reason to offer contributions.  But now  sophisticated
rational agents, knowing that others will eventually learn, may have an even stronger incentive to
"teach" their opponents that they do not care with the hope that the opponents will give in first.
As the above example suggests, closely related to the issue of learning is the issue of time
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 See Groves and Ledyard (1977), Jackson (1991), Myerson (1985), and Postelwaite and Schmeidler (1987).
3
 This is to be expected, given the folk theorems of infinitely, see for example Rubinstein (1979), and finitely, see
Friedman (1985) and Benoit and Krishna (1985), repeated games.  More closely related, however, are well known
works on repeated games with incomplete information and reputation, for example Aumann and Maschler (1967),
Kreps et al (1982),  Neyman (1985), Fudenberg and Maskin (1986),  and Fudenberg and Levine (1989).   The
feature of these papers, that early reputation is built to be enjoyed throughout the duration of the game, takes on a
different form when an uninformed, but poweful, implementor is brought into the picture.
4
 An interesting take on this problem can be found in Rangel(1997) where he looks at public goods in an overlapping
3preference.  It is quite likely that the levels  of patience of the agents and the implementor will
have a significant influence on the outcome of the interaction.  Of particular interest to us is the
difference in the patience rates between the social implementor and the economic agents.  Our
intuition is as follows.  (1) Without learning by the planner, all implementation must be done as,
or is equivalent to, one shot implementation even in problems that admit intertemporal solutions
such as the growth model or sequential candidate choice.  (2) If agents also do not learn or if they
are extremely impatient, then we are constrained to Bayesian implementation.  (3) If agents do
learn, the results of Kalai and Lehrer (1993) and others tell us they will eventually play a Nash
equilibrium in the true environment.  So even if the planner does not learn, if the planner is
patient enough then Nash implementation may be possible.  (4) Somewhat surprisingly, we will
show below that if the planner learns and is more patient than the agents, then we can achieve
dominant strategy implementation, making it irrelevant whether the agents learn or not.  (5) What
we don't yet have a feel for is what happens if all learn but some agents are more patient than the
planner, although an infinitely impatient planner is probably restricted to the equivalent of a
sequence of one shot implementations.
In this paper we prove a result that illustrates how significant these issues may be.   Our
purpose in presenting it is not to supply a general model, but rather to illustrate the power of the
phenomenon.  For that reason, we keep  this example as elementary and simple as possible.   In
particular, we show how patience on the part of the implementor can help her in overcoming the
information extraction problem.   When we take it to an extreme, where she is only interested in
doing things right in the long run, as compared to the economic agents who perform time
discounting,  we see that dominant strategy implementation becomes limitless.   This is in
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4striking contrast to the Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) theorem that shows that in a one
shot problem, dominant strategy implementation can only be used to implement dictatorial
choices.
We are able to get this strong implementation result, using a strictly dominant strategies
equilibrium,  in a simple direct revelation game involving a single type-declaration move at an
initial stage.  Using the revelation principle, this saves us from having to write a general model
with a discussion of a variety of equilibrium options.  But less severe assumptions and a search
for necessary conditions, as opposed to our sufficient one, will undoubtedly require significantly
more modeling involving notions of Nash and/or Bayesian implementation.  The revelation
principle will still hold for Bayesian implementation and the type of revelation game we use in
the next section could continue to be a major tool for the analysis of implementation in more
complex environments.
Finally, we have made the analysis quite simple by restricting the number of players'
types to be finite and by considering stationary environments.  This paper is meant to illustrate a
fundamental contrast between  repeated and one shot  implementation.   Attempts by us to obtain
similar results under the most general conditions would only cloud the issues by turning this into
a learning, rather than an implementation, paper.  We note, however, that the inference used in
our simple mechanism is a special case of Bayesian learning, and we refer the interested reader to
papers of Jordan (1991) and Kalai and Lehrer (1993) for more powerful generalizations.
52. Patient Implementation by Dominant Strategies
The Environment
A, with generic elements a,b, denotes a set of social alternatives.
N, with generic elements i,j, denotes a finite set of economic agents.
Θi, with generic elements θi, denotes a finite set of player i types.
Θ = ×i Θi, with generic elements θ, denotes the set of type profiles.
ui(θi,a) denotes the utility of a player i from the alternative a when he is of type θi.
A∞ is the set of infinite sequences of social alternatives. For each
a A a a a a t∞ ∞ ∞∈ =, ( , , ... , , ...). we write 1 2
δi, a real number between 0 and 1, denotes the discount parameter of agent i.
  
ui(θi,a∞ ) = δ it −1ui (θi ,at )t=1
∞∑
Repeated Implementation
An outcome function o assigns to each type profile θ an outcome sequence  o(θ) ∈A∞
.
Since, for our purpose, revelation games and dominant strategy equilibria are sufficient,
we restrict the notions of implementations to these cases.
A revelation game form g is a function assigning an outcome sequence to each (reported)
type profile θ, i.e.,  for every θ θg A( ) .∈ ∞
The revelation game g dominance-implements the outcome function o if for each type
profile θ,
61. for each agent i, θi is a dominant strategy in the game induced by g and by θ, and
2. g(θ) = o(θ).
In this paper, we restrict attention to perfectly patient planners.   That is, we assume
throughout that if there are two outcome functions g(θ) and h(θ) and a time T such that g(θ)t =
h(θ)t for all t > T then the planner is indifferent between g and h.  Such a planner cares only about
eventual implementation. It is sufficient, for example, that the planner’s utility function be
V T v aT
tT
= →∞ ∑lim ( / ) ( ).1 1   With this in mind, we can relax the concept of dominance-
implementation.
The revelation game g patiently dominance-implements the outcome function o if for
each type profile θ,
1. each θi is a dominant strategy as above, and
2. for some time T, g(θ)t = o(θ)t for all t > T.
If we can find a game g that patiently dominance-implements the outcome function o we
say that o is patiently dominance implementable.
As we will see below, a patient planner can rely on revealed preference to extract all
relevant information from the players without worrying about incentive compatibility.  This,
however, requires a simple condition that says that the different types of a player are sufficiently
different.
We say that types are separable in the environment if for every player i and for every
distinct types θi and θi  there is a pair of social alternatives a and b in A with ui(θi,a) < ui(θi,b)
and u a u bi i i i( , ) ( , ).θ θ>
An example of violation of separability is when a player i has two types, θi and θi , with
7type θi being completely indifferent between all the social alternatives and type θi  not being
completely indifferent (a more detailed discussion of this condition is offered in the sequel).  The
power of the assumption that types are separable is given by the following theorem.
Theorem:  In a types separable environment with bounded utility functions, every outcome
function is patiently dominance implementable.
Proof:  Given the outcome function o, we will construct the function g with the following two
properties:
(Uniform) eventual coincidence with o.  For some time T for all type profiles θ ∈Θ  and all t > T,
g(θ)t = o(θ)t.
Strict dominance of truthful revelation.  For all type profiles θ ∈Θ  and for every player i
u gi i i n( , ( , ... , $ , ... , )θ θ θ θ1 ) is uniquely maximized at $ .θ θi i=
We will select positive integers D1, D2, …, Dn and C with the following properties.  The
first D1 periods will represent player 1’s tenure as a dictator.  This means that all social choices
during this period, g(θ)t  for t = 1,2,...,D1, will depend entirely on θ1 and be independent of θj
with j ≠ 1.  Similarly, the next D2 periods will represent player 2’s tenure as dictator, and so on.
Thus, each player in succession will receive a number of periods when only his preferences
dictate the social outcomes in a manner described below.
Following this sequential dictatorship phase of length D1 + D2 + ... + Dn, the subsequent
C periods represent a cooling down phase.  The social choices during these periods will be
independent of θ.  For example, a constant alternative a, which is the same for all θ, will be
repeated C times.
8We let W be the waiting time, denoting the length of the initial phase consisting of all the
dictatorships and the cooling down period, W = D1 + D2 + ... + Dn + C.  Following this initial
segment we define the period of eventually "doing the right thing" by g(θ)t = o(θ)t for
t = W + 1, W+ 2,...  Notice that the first desired property, eventual coincidence of g and o, is
thus satisfied if θ is revealed correctly.
The selection of social choices during the dictatorship phase of player i is described as
follows.  Let the length of the dictatorship phase, Di, be the number of unordered pairs of distinct
types of player i and let p p pDi1 2, ,...,  be a fixed enumeration of these pairs.  For each pq let
(aq,bq) be an ordered pair of social alternatives separating the pair of types of pq, and let Li = D1 +
D2 + ... + Di-1 denote the last period prior to player i's dictatorship.  For q = 1,2,...,Di define
g L qi( )θ +  to be the preferred choice between aq and bq, according to θi if ui(θi,aq) ≠ ui(θi,bq).
Otherwise, let g aL q qi( ) .θ + =
If player i's true type is θi, then reporting θi  ≠ θi will strictly decrease his total payoff
during his dictatorship.  During all the periods Li + q in which he is really indifferent between aq
and bq he is also indifferent between the social choices resulting from reporting θi and reporting
θi .  In periods of no indifference he can only lose by switching from θi to θi .  And at least in one
period, the one corresponding to the pair {θi, θi },  he strictly loses by reporting θi .
Since player i does not affect the social outcomes during the dictatorships of the other
players, player i also strictly maximizes his own utility during the entire sequential dictatorships
phase by reporting his true type.
The purpose of the cooling down period is to keep this strict preference for true revelation
for the entire game.  By counting on the discounting of the players, we can make the duration of
9the cooling down time, C, sufficiently long that all the discounted utility received after the
cooling down period is meaningless in comparison to the strict preferences established during a
person's tenure as a dictator.  Since the number of player types is finite, and since θi was the
unique maximizer of a player's utility during his dictatorship, C can be chosen to be finite.  QED
While the theorem and proof above were selected mainly to make the presentation of the
message simple, we foresee possible improvements in both the statement of the theorem and the
constructed mechanism.  For this purpose the following comments may be useful.
3. On the Condition of Type Separability
As usual in Bayesian settings, different types of a player may stand for different
preferences, but they may also stand for different information.   For example, a player i may be of
two types, one type possessing private information  that the state of the environment is in a set A,
with the other type possessing the information not  in A.  Assume further that, despite the
different information, the two types have identical preferences over the social alternatives.  In
this case the types are not separable, and our mechanism would fail if we wish to implement
different social alternatives for these two types.
Another failure of separability occurs when two types of a player are identical in all their
ordinal selections among pairs of socially feasible alternatives, but the intensity of their
preferences is different.  Consider, for example, the following allocation problem.  In each period
there is one unit of a perishable indivisible item to be allocated to either player 1 or player 2.
Formally, the social choices in each period are (1,0) or (0,1), indicating the player that receives 1
unit and the player that receives 0 units of the item.  Each player may be of two types:  one that
10
highly values the item, θi, and another type, θi , that has a low, even if positive, value for the
item.  Formally, let u1(θ1,(1,0)) = 2, u1( θ1 ,(1,0)) = 1, and u1(θ1,(0,1)) = u1( θ1 ,(0,1)) = 0, with
similar types θ2 and θ2  defined for player 2.
The implementor desires to implement the following outcome function.  If one of the
players is of the high type and the other is of a low type, the item should be given repeatedly to
the high-type player.  If both players are of the same type, the item should be given to player 1 on
even periods and to player 2 on odd periods.
It is easy to see that this outcome function cannot be implemented and that the type-
separation condition fails.  If the implementor could introduce another social alternative to create
separation it would work.  For example, if he could offer some temporary private good whose
utility to the low types was greater than 1 and to the high types was smaller than 2, he could
separate their initial types by giving them dictatorial choices involving the separating temporary
good early on, and later doing the "right thing."
4. Simpler Randomizing Mechanisms
If the implementor can randomize in making choices, simpler mechanisms work.  The
following random-dictator revelation mechanism is an example.
In an initial period, each player i announces a type θi.  Then, in the first step, the
implementor randomly chooses a player i and  one of this player’s separating pairs of alternatives
(from the earlier constructions) pq = (aq,bq).  The selected social alternative is aq or bq according
to the strict preference of the reported θi (make it  aq if θi is indifferent between the two).  To
obtain the strict dominance result it is enough now to generate a long cooling off phase as before,
11
and follow it for all periods t afterwards by selecting o(θ)t.
A second and, perhaps, better alternative for the cooling off phase is to use the same
alternative aq or bq, chosen for the first period, and to make it the repeated social selection for
many periods.  This strengthens the incentives of impatient players to reveal correctly, resulting
in a shorter cooling off phase.
5. On the Patience of the Implementor
First conceptually,  the assumption of patient implementor may be more suitable to
implementation problems within organizations.  For example the dean of a school may be
interested in the long run performance (or the evaluation by others of how he contributed to the
long run performance) of the school, while the faculty members may be taking a shorter time
horizon in their individual optimization problems.   But in social implementation, for example in
constitutional design, the assumption of patient implementor with impatient participants is more
questionable and should be a subject for further study.  For example assuming time consistency
on the part of the implementor may lead to behavior compatible with a higher level of patience.
From a technical viewpoint, our construction was very wasteful and in specific
applications one may assume much less than perfect patience, depending on the nature of the
outcome function and the extend of diversity among types.  For example, in the extreme case that
the participants are completely myopic the random-dictator mechanism described above strictly-
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